The US-British-Australian alliance

The US-British-Australian alliance in the face of China and the cancellation of the French submarine deal for Canberra (and its replacement with US nuclear submarines) came as a big surprise to the French leadership of Emmanuel Macron, who aspires strongly for a global role for his country, and wants to achieve results that will bring him back to the presidency in the elections next year.

This took place at a time when the world had not yet fully comprehended the repercussions of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the surprise (for everyone this time) that the Taliban's very rapid seizure of power in Kabul had formed, and the Europeans (as well as the American public) as well as major global and regional powers, such as Russia, China and India This surprise came with appeals to the Taliban to form an inclusive government, and to observe women's rights, with clear attempts by Beijing and Moscow to try to exploit the vacuum created by the withdrawal.

The new American policies, under Joe Biden, were reflected in some Arab countries, and there was a remarkable French role in this context. We witnessed French-Iranian sponsorship of an international conference in Baghdad, which was considered a return to Iraq on the regional map, as we witnessed other French-Iranian sponsorship that contributed After waiting 13 months for the formation of the Lebanese government, Najib Mikati, and it was remarkable that the latter, yesterday, talked about his foreign tour "to activate the international-regional settlement."

There was also a movement within the Egyptian-Jordanian axis, which apparently wanted to invest in the new American policies, in moving the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and another movement towards passing Egyptian gas through Jordan and Syria to Lebanon, with the potential of "normalization" that this entailed. Arab and international relations with the Syrian regime, which Iran faced by entering fuel shipments to Lebanon, also through Syria, so that it seemed like a competition to show who has more influence on the files of the two rickety regimes in Syria and Lebanon.

The issue of negotiations with the Taliban, and the outcomes of the situation in Afghanistan, gave great credibility to the Qatari policy, which was the sponsor of those negotiations and the main mediator in dealing with the Taliban, and the UAE did not hesitate to try to influence the Afghan file, by receiving the fugitive Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, on the one hand. On the other hand, it sent an aid plane to Afghanistan.

As part of a move to anticipate the repercussions of the Afghan event, Abu Dhabi seemed to be re-evaluating a comprehensive assessment of its foreign policies, and this was reflected in the reopening of political lines with Turkey and Qatar.

Saudi Arabia, which was surprised by the withdrawal of American Patriot batteries from its territory and allowing the publication of secret documents related to it on the subject of the September 2001 attacks, in turn recounted its losses, and after its important initiative to ease Gulf tension and lift the siege on Qatar, it began rearranging its cards again, to accommodate developments world and interact with it.

There are other Arab files that are still open, and are shrouded in ambiguity by the repercussions of America's preoccupation with China's affairs, including the Libyan and Tunisian files, and it is clear that France, Russia and China are preparing, each on its part, to enable its situation and prepare its papers until the picture becomes clearer.